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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ed to all trivial indignities. However, the instant decision should not be
looked upon as an extension of liability for causing emotional distress ny
more than if the court had held the recovery to be for the invasion of pri-
vacy. The court applied the general rules applied to the right of privacy
and resolved that, "Defendant should have reasonably anticipated that 'the
open post card would fall into the hands of plaintiff's wife, would be reaid
by her and would cause such reaction as it actually did cause in this case."
The opinion therefore took into consideration the requirements for recovery
under the right of privacy. 14 In holding that the right to personal security
in his home, including the right to enjoyment of life, and the enjoyment of
the happiness of the home and the love and confidence of his wife was vio-
lated, it went no further. The only question which could then arise is,
whether the court properly resolved the requirements in accordance with ;he
facts, not whether the theory of relief was beyond that usually given by
a court.
DANIEL R. TWICHELL
WILLS - LIFE INSURANCE - CHANCE OF BENEFICIARlY BY WILL. - By the
terms of his last will, X bequeathed all his property, including the proceeds
of life insurance policies, to W, his wife. The will alternately provided that
X bequeathed all of said property to G, his grandmother, in the event he
should die unmarried. W, the designated beneficiary in the policies, di-
vorced X, who died shortly thereafter without having made any attempt,
beyond his testamentary declaration, to effect a change of beneficiary in
compliance with the requisites prescribed in the policies. Both W and G
claimed the insurance proceeds in an action in which the insurers inter-
pleaded and paid into court the amounts due under their respective policies.
Held: the will executed by X could not effect a change of beneficiary. Stone
v. Septhens, 99 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio 1951).
The named beneficiary in an insurance policy, which reserves to the in-
sured the privilege of changing the beneficiary therein, enjoys only an ex-
pecancy during the lifetime of the insured, which does not become a vested
right until the insured's death. Similarly, the expectation of a legatee under
a will vests only upon the death of the testator since it may always be re-
voked or adeemed. When the conflicting expectations of a beneficiary ard
a legatee supposedly vest simultaneously at the death of the insured-testator,
which should prevail?
Although the interest of the beneficiary in an insurance policy during the
lifetime of the insured is commonly treated as a mere expectancy or con-
tingency,1 it seems that such interest has the character of a more secured
right. The limitations upon the reserved right of the insured to change his
beneficiary at will, as outlined in the contract of insurance, are sometimes
said to be for the benefit of the insurer alone,2 but it is certain that both
insured and beneficiary are protected and benefited as well. 3 One expres-
14. The court also stated that the implication of the post card was libelous.
1. Freund v. Freund, 218 I1. 189. 75 N.E. 925 (1905).
2. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 98 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. W. Va. 1950).
8. See Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 621, 628 (1982); See
Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W.2d 70 (1987).
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sion of this view, contrary to the general opinion, is that the beneficiary has
a vested interest, subject to be divested by the insured only by following
the specified procedure.
4 However, definition of the beneficiary's interest
prior to the death of the insured does not appear to be the sole controlling
factor.5
The great majority of courts uphold the rule that a provision of the in-
sured's will is ineffectual toward compliance with the requirements of the
insurance policy whereby the name of the beneficiary may be changed,
°
except, of course, where the policy is silent as to the method of making such
change,- or where no specific person is named as beneficiary." The method
outlined in the policy for designating a new beneficiary is considered ex-
clusive,9 subject only to the equitable exceptions of waiver of strict compli-
ance by the insurer, impossibility of literal compliance by the insured, and
where the insured has done everything in his power to accomplish the change.-'
Whatever may be the interest of the beneficiary in an insurance policy,
it is fundamental that the actions of the insured in expressing his intent
to change the beneficiary are of prime importance. There is appealing au-
thority favoring the interest of the legatee in the instant case in view of the
general policy of the courts in giving effect to the last expressed intent of
a testator, wherever possible.1l According to this minority view, the only
essential acts to be performed by the insured are those which manifest a
clear intention to change the beneficiary.12 Where such an intent is mani-
fested by will, it has been given effect by courts which reason that the desires
of the insured are paramount to the technical requirements of the policy.-'
In effect, these decisions hold that the formality of executing a valid will
4. United States v. Burgo, 175 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1949) (decision based on New
Jersey law); Siebold N;. Mavfield, 136 N.J.L. 512, 57 A.2d 248 (1948). Contra: Rasmussen
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 70 N.D. 295, 293 N.W. 805 (1940) (designated
beneficiary acquires no vested interest).
5. Stephenson v. Stephenson, 64 Iowa 534, 21 N.W. 19 (1884).
6. Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal.2d 639, 111 P.2d 322 (1941); Johnson v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 56 Colo. 178, 138 Pac. 414 (1914) (case collected); Daniels v. Pratt, 143
Mass. 216, 10 N.E. 166 (1887) (policy required change of beneficiary to be made
during insured's lifetime).
7. Jorgensen v. DeViney, 57 N.D. 63, 222 N.W. 464 (1928) (the change of beneficiary
clause in the policy stated merely that such change should take effect "upon the indorse-
ment of the same on the policy by the company . . ."). Provisions of this type generally
have been considered restrictive of the right to change beneficiary and non-compliance
renders void an attempted disposition by will or otherwise.
8. Anderson v. Northern & Dakota Trust Co., 67 N.D. 458, 274 N.W. 127 (1937)
(where payable to the estate of the insured); Hill v. Hanna, 57 N.D. 412, 222 N.W.
459 (1928) (where 'payable to executor).
9. Miller v. Miller, 200 Iowa 1070, 205 N.W. 870 (1925) (cases collected). But see
Eickelkamp v. Carl, 193 Ark. 1155, 104 S.W.2d 814 (1937).
10. Shuman v. Ancient Order of United Workmen, 110 Iowa 642, 82 N.W. 331, 332
(1900) (original beneficiary's interest vested at death of insured and subsequent notice
to insurer could not divert her rights).
11. Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W.2d 70 (1937); Finnerty v. Cook, 118
Colo. 310, 195 P.2d 973 (1948) (war risk insurance).
12. Typifying the liberal construction of insurance contracts is Arnold v. Newcomb,
104 Ohio St. 578, 136 N.E. 206 (1922) in which the rules and by-laws incorporated into
the contract provided that the change of beneficiary would not become valid or binding
until the old policy was cancelled and a new one issued in its place. Insured had executed
the proper form and left it with his wife, the new beneficiary, who did not forward it to
the insurer until after insured's delth more than 11 months later. The court held that this
was substantial compliance and awarded the wife the proceeds of the policy.
13. Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W.2d 70 (1937); Eickelkamp v. Carl, 193
Ark. 1155, 104 S.W.2d 814 (1937).
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serves to satisfy the provisions of the policy as to change of bcneficlary,
thereby avoiding results which often seem harsh.14
Additional support is given to the minority view by the theory that irder-
pleader of the insurance company and payment into court of the proceeds
of the policy constitute a waiver of the policy requirements. 1 5 It is con-
sidered the provisions for change of beneficiary are for tile benefit of the
insurer, it alone may question the eligibility of beneficiaries and insist upon
strict compliance; and, for those reasons, it alone can waive compliance.ltr
This theory is rejected by the majority of courts, however, which follow
the rule that the filing of an action of interpleader by the insurer cannot
operate as a waiver of the policy's requirement as to change of beneficiary
and thereby effectuate an otherwise defective substitution of beneficiaries. 7
The rights of the named beneficiary become vested on the death. of the
insured and cannot thereafter be affected by a subsequent act of the insurer.",
In disallowing the last declared intent of the insured, the decision of the
instant case conforms to the rule exercised in most jurisdictions in regard
to such expressions by will and, of course, less formal means. The rule is
consonant with the ideal of certainty required in the public interest of in-
surance rights and liabilitiesl9 Yet, no less attention is required or paid
to certainty in the execution and administration of wills. There is compelling
reason, therefore, to recognize the overriding factor of the last declaration
of intent by the insured when made by will and to allow distribution of in-
surance proceeds accordingly.
PAUL K. PANCRATZ
WILLS - REVOCATION BY OPERATION OF LAW - DIVORCE WITH A PROP-
ERTY SETTLEMENT. - Plaintiff's former wife died leaving a will which con-
tained a bequest to him of $1000. Subsequent to the making of this will
she had obtained a divorce with a property settlement. The court held that
a divorce with a property settlement did not act as a revocation by operation
of law of a previously executed will. Ireland v. Terwilliger, 54 So.2d
Fla. 1951 ).
The general doctrine of revocation by operation of law was developed in
England.' Two events which would act as such a revocation were the sub-
sequent marriage of a feme sole 2 and the subsequent marriage and birth
14. In war risk insurance cases involving change of beneficiary, courts brush aside
legal technicalities to effectuate the insured's manifest intention. See Roberts v. United
States, 157 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1946). But cf. Owens v. Owens, 305 Ky. 460, 204 S.W.2d
580 (1947).
15. Arrington v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of Trainmen, 21 F.2d 914 (5th Cir. 1927).
16. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 93 F. Supp. 538 (S.D. W. Va. 1950).
17. Equitable Life Assurance Society v. McClelland, 85 F. Supp. 688 (W.D. Mich.
1949) (insurance company was a party to the action).
18. Rasmussen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 70 N.D. 295, 29.3 N.W. 805
(1940); Dogariu v. Dogariu, 306 Mich. 392, 11 N.W.2d 1 (1943); Knights of Macachees
of the World v. Sackett, 34 Mont. 357, 86 Pac. 423 (1906) any waiver regarding a
change of beneficiary must occur during the lifetime of the insured. After the death of
the insured, the insurer cannot waive anything to the prejudice of the beneficiary).
19. The controlling factor in Wannamaker v. Stroman. 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 621
(1932) seemed to be the policy consideration of prompt payment to properly designated
beneficiaries without incurring liability.
1. Atkinson, Wills 397 (1937).
2. E.g. Vandeveer v. Higgins, 59 Neb. 333., 80 N.W. 1043 (1899); Colcord v. Conroy,
40 Fla. 97, 23 So. 561 (1898); Nutt v. Norton, 142 Mass. 242. 7 N.E. 720 (1886)
(marriage and birth of issue to a woman revoked her will).
